SINGAPORE – On Tuesday morning, under the humid glare at Changi Exhibition Centre, executives in dark suits walked past fighter-jet flyovers and glossy mockups of cabin interiors toward quieter rooms where the real spectacle of the 2026 Singapore Airshow unfolds: negotiations for airplanes that are increasingly hard to get, increasingly politicized—and increasingly judged by the traveling public on a single word: safety.

The airshow (Feb. 3–8) opened amid a paradox. Demand across Asia-Pacific is rising briskly, but global supply chains—engines, castings, labor, certification timelines—remain tight enough that airlines are planning around delivery slots the way concertgoers plan around sold-out tours.

In that squeeze, the rivalry between Boeing and Airbus is no longer only about fuel burn and financing. In Southeast Asia, it is also about whether a manufacturer can:

• offer the right narrow-body aircraft for a new generation of low-cost and “hybrid” airlines,
• deliver on a timeline that matches growth plans, and
• answer hard questions from regulators and passengers about manufacturing quality and oversight.

Cambodia’s Boeing bet—and why it matters

One deal announced at the airshow captured the shift.

Cambodia’s flag carrier—recently rebranded as Air Cambodia—confirmed an order for 10 Boeing 737 MAX jets with options for 10 more, its first purchase of Boeing aircraft after operating European-built jets.

Based on the deal disclosed this week, the publicly reported purchase is from Boeing, and the coverage explicitly frames it as a “first” for the airline with Boeing—without a corresponding Airbus order announcement.

The order is small by global standards, but large in symbolism: a narrow-body fleet choice can lock in decades of pilot training, maintenance tooling, simulator spend, and supplier relationships. In a region where low-cost carriers dominate many domestic and short-haul international routes, those lock-ins matter.

Airbus answers with the aircraft Southeast Asia keeps asking for

Airbus, for its part, used the airshow to highlight the kind of fleet renewal that is now routine for airlines built around dense routes and price-sensitive travelers. Airbus disclosed an order for four A321neo aircraft from Tigerair Taiwan—modest in number, but aligned with an industry-wide push to “up-gauge” from smaller narrow-bodies to larger ones to make scarce slots and rising costs pencil out.

That trend—larger narrow-bodies with longer legs—has become the signature demand signal in and around Southeast Asia: A321neos, A321LRs and A321XLRs are increasingly treated as the workhorses for new kinds of airlines: low-cost carriers stretching into medium-haul markets, and network carriers trying to rebuild profitability without betting everything on wide-bodies.

“New markets, new requirements”: what airlines want now

Across the region, the “requirements” airlines talk about in private meetings tend to sound less like marketing and more like arithmetic:

1. More seats on the same runway slots (bigger narrow-bodies).
2. Longer range without wide-body economics (A321XLR-class missions).
3. Fuel efficiency and emissions pressure (new engines, SAF readiness).
4. Reliability and maintenance access (parts, MRO capacity, predictable shop visits).
5. On-time delivery (the new competitive weapon).

Even Boeing’s own regional forecasting, presented during the airshow week, underscores how narrow-body heavy the next two decades look: Boeing’s outlook for Southeast Asia cites more than 4,800 new aircraft needed from 2025 to 2044, with about 80% narrow-bodies.

The demand picture across the 10 ASEAN members—plus Timor-Leste

Your question asked for the “current airline demand” in each of the 11 countries (the 10 members of ASEAN plus Timor-Leste, which has been moving toward membership and is positioning tourism as a growth lever).

There is no single official “shopping list” for each country, but the clearest observable demand comes from (a) order books and delivery schedules, and (b) airport expansion and route growth. Regionally, CAPA estimates Southeast Asian airlines collectively have about 1,700 aircraft on order, 83% narrow-bodies—a shorthand for how much growth is already queued up, even before new deals are signed.

Below is a country-by-country demand profile—what the market is pulling for, and the aircraft types that fit it.

Indonesia

A vast domestic geography and slot-constrained hubs push demand toward high-cycle narrow-bodies. The country’s airline groups have historically been among the world’s largest narrow-body customers, and the market is a proving ground for high-utilization, low-cost models. Regional demand remains tied to fleet renewal and sustained domestic growth—exactly the scenario that favors A320-family and 737-family aircraft, plus some wide-bodies for pilgrimage and long-haul trunk routes.

Philippines

The Philippines’ growth story is tightly linked to low-cost expansion and an archipelago that rewards frequency. The clearest signal: Cebu Pacific’s firm order for 70 A321neo (and a broader purchase framework the airline has described publicly as part of a much larger plan), underscoring confidence that bigger narrow-bodies can profitably serve dense leisure and VFR markets.

Vietnam

Vietnam has been one of the region’s fastest-growing aviation markets, with demand split between (1) domestic trunk routes that reward up-gauging and (2) international expansion. Fleet plans in the region show how LCCs and full-service carriers both lean toward narrow-body growth while wide-bodies are deployed selectively.

Thailand

Thailand’s aviation demand is tied to tourism recovery and hub ambitions, with airlines renewing fleets and adding narrow-bodies for regional flying. CAPA notes Thai carriers taking deliveries and planning continued narrow-body expansion—again reflecting the region’s shift toward efficient single-aisles as the default growth vehicle.

Malaysia

Malaysia’s demand is closely associated with low-cost network growth. AirAsia has pursued long-range narrow-body capability with an MoU for 50 A321XLRs with conversion rights for 20 more, a bid to open thinner long routes without wide-body economics—exactly the “new type of airline” playbook you referenced.

Singapore

Singapore’s market is less about domestic scale and more about being a premium hub with high service standards and connectivity. That tends to translate into a mix: wide-bodies for long-haul, and narrow-bodies for regional feed via the LCC ecosystem. The airshow itself is a reminder that the city-state’s aviation ambitions are also expanding into new verticals—such as a new space-focused summit announced alongside the exhibition.

Cambodia

Cambodia’s demand is smaller but becoming more concrete, as shown by Air Cambodia’s MAX order. The drivers are straightforward: tourism growth aspirations, regional connectivity, and the move from smaller/older equipment into mainstream narrow-bodies with strong resale and leasing markets.

Myanmar

Myanmar’s aviation demand has been more volatile due to political and economic constraints; the near-term picture is typically shaped as much by operating environment as by aircraft preference. The longer-term demand logic still points to narrow-bodies for regional routes—if conditions allow sustained traffic growth.

Laos

Laos, like Cambodia, is a smaller market where demand often centers on right-sized capacity and dependable operations—traditionally turboprops and smaller jets—while watching how new entrants (including regional jet makers) might offer alternatives as networks mature. The airshow spotlight on new competitors such as COMAC has heightened that interest across parts of the region.

Brunei

Brunei’s market is small but high-income and connectivity-oriented, generally requiring a disciplined fleet strategy: a few narrow-bodies for regional links and wide-bodies for longer sectors, with service standards emphasized over volume.

Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste is the outlier in a revealing way: it is not (yet) a large aircraft buyer, but it is trying to grow tourism and connectivity while meeting international safety expectations.

A key constraint is structural: international access has historically depended heavily on foreign carriers and their profitability calculus, making capacity and connectivity fragile.

But Timor-Leste has also been working on the preconditions for sustainable growth: it reported progress on aviation safety oversight systems, regulatory harmonization, inspector capacity, and aerodrome certification in an ICAO-related regional forum document.

More flights are beginning to appear as the market opens: Batik Air, for example, has added frequencies on Kuala Lumpur–Dili service in recent months, an example of the incremental connectivity expansion that tourism strategies rely on.

For Timor-Leste, “meeting service standards” is less about buying brand-new aircraft immediately and more about ensuring that any operators serving the country—foreign or domestic—can meet oversight, training, and airport certification requirements that reassure travelers, insurers, and partner states.

Boeing and Airbus now compete against the calendar

The aircraft race in Southeast Asia is increasingly a race against delivery timelines.

Airbus ended 2025 with a record backlog of 8,754 aircraft, a sign of demand strength but also a measure of waiting time for customers.
Boeing’s backlog has been reported around 6,700 aircraft at year-end 2025 by industry tracking, with the 737 MAX dominating its order book.

When you ask whether Boeing’s delivery backdrop is “around 16 years,” the best evidence suggests: not typically 16 years, but long enough to reshape airline strategy.

• One industry analysis translates Boeing’s backlog into roughly 11+ years at a given delivery pace assumption.
• Boeing has also highlighted delivery positions stretching from 2026 to 2033 in connection with major 737 MAX orders for leasing customers—an implicit acknowledgment that many near-term slots are already spoken for.

In practice, the timeline depends on model, engine availability, certification status, and production rate approvals. And those variables have become more politically and regulatorily visible since the 737 MAX crises and later manufacturing issues.

What Boeing does to answer safety questions now

Boeing has been forced—by regulators, lawmakers, and public attention—to respond to safety questions with more than reassurance. Its posture now has three overlapping layers:

1) A formal “Safety & Quality Plan”

Boeing publicly describes a safety and quality plan organized around workforce training, simplifying processes, eliminating defects, and elevating safety and quality culture, with ongoing monitoring of production system health.

2) A regulator-imposed reality: tighter FAA oversight

After the January 2024 door-plug blowout and related scrutiny, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration emphasized direct oversight of Boeing production processes, the implementation of Boeing’s Safety Management System, and whistleblower protections. The FAA has repeatedly framed its stance in terms of “accountability” and layered systems to detect and mitigate risk.

The FAA has also, at times, adjusted production-rate permissions—decisions that are themselves portrayed as contingent on safety reviews.

3) Public testimony and pressure

Boeing leadership has faced pointed questioning in the U.S. Senate about safety culture, including acknowledgment (in prepared remarks reported by Reuters) that the company’s culture has been “far from perfect,” alongside claims of corrective action and quality-improvement commitments.

That mixture—internal plans, external oversight, and political scrutiny—is now part of the Boeing sales conversation globally, including in ASEAN markets where public confidence and regulator trust are prerequisites for tourism-dependent growth.

Airbus’s counterpoint: demand is there, but supply chains still bite

Airbus’ message has been steadier: demand remains strong, but supply chains—especially engines—continue to constrain deliveries in 2025–2026. Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury has publicly pointed to the ongoing challenge of sourcing engines and the resulting delivery backlog.

In other words, Airbus competes not by claiming short waits, but by persuading airlines that its aircraft, support ecosystem, and product roadmap best match the region’s shift toward larger and longer-range narrow-bodies.

A third shadow at the airshow: China’s COMAC

No Boeing–Airbus story in 2026 is complete without the aircraft that keeps appearing at the edge of the frame: China’s COMAC, which showcased the C919’s ambitions at the airshow while seeking wider certification credibility. Even if COMAC is not yet a primary procurement option for most ASEAN flag carriers, its presence matters because it changes bargaining dynamics—and signals that Southeast Asian airlines are willing to listen to alternatives when the duopoly can’t deliver quickly enough.

The bottom line

In Southeast Asia, airplane buying has become a high-stakes exercise in timing, trust, and fit.

• Timing, because delivery queues shape route networks years in advance.
• Trust, because manufacturing quality and oversight have become part of brand value.
• Fit, because the “new airlines” of the region—low-cost, long-range narrow-body, hybrid network models—need aircraft that match thin routes, dense leisure corridors, and carbon pressure all at once.

The Singapore Airshow is where those forces collide—quietly, contract by contract—under the roar of jets.

Sources: AP, Reuters, Boeing, Airbus